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Résumé / Abstract
Cet article propose un modèle de comportement de la firme en
réorganisation financière dans lequel la structure du contrat de réorganisation, et
plus particulièrement la répartition entre les paiements comptants et différés, est
utilisée afin de transmettre de linformation aux créanciers non-informés sur la
viabilité de la firme. Les prédictions du modèle sont testées à laide dune banque
de données originale de 393 entreprises canadiennes en réorganisation financière.
Lanalyse empirique confirme que la probabilité de succès en réorganisation
augmente avec la proportion des paiements à court terme (3 à 6 mois) aux
créanciers non-garantis, après avoir contrôlé pour la contrainte de liquidité des
entreprises. De plus, la probabilité dacceptation dune proposition par les
créanciers non-garantis augmente avec la proportion des paiements comptants
(1 mois) et la probabilité de succès de la proposition telle quanticipée par les
créanciers.
This article proposes a signaling model of financial reorganization
in which the firms use the provisions of the reorganization proposal, in
particular the split between short term cash and deferred payments, to signal
their viability to uninformed unsecured creditors. The empirical analysis based
on an original data set of 393 Canadian firms in reorganization confirms that the
probability of success in reorganization increases with the proportion of short
term cash payments (3 to 6 months) to unsecured creditors, when controlling for
the fact that firms are cash constrained. Also, the probability of acceptance of
a proposal by unsecured creditors increases with the proportion of up-front
payments (1 month) and the perceived probability of success of the proposal by
unsecured creditors.
Bankruptcy laws in a number of industrial countries, especially in the U.S.
and to a certain extent in Canada, have been highly criticized by economists
and jurists recently.
1
An important criticism of these bankruptcy systems lies
in the simultaneous existence of a liquidation and a reorganization procedure
for nancially distressed rms which gives rise to ltering failures whereby
inecient rms may be saved by the reorganization procedure while ecient
rms may be eliminated by the liquidation procedure. Using a a game the-
oretical model, White (1994) shows how the U.S. bankruptcy system can
generate pooling equilibria where more ecient rms gain by pretending to
be less ecient and less ecient rms gain by pretending to be more ecient.
The ltering problems in bankruptcy originate from the presence of asym-
metric information between a rm and its creditors about the rm's viability
which impacts on the creditors' decision to accept or reject a reorganization
proposal.
Given the deciencies of the bankruptcy systems, one should ask whether
there exist any means by which ecient rms can minimize the occurence of
ltering failures. The rst contribution of this article is to propose an model
of nancial reorganization in the presence of asymmetric information with
respect to the rms' viability which exploits the information content of the
reorganization proposal and its impact on the creditors' participation and
on the expected outcome of reorganization as dened by the probability of
success.
2
The model focuses on situations where rms face an internal cash
constraint and a loan extension constraint from the bank, which is argued to
be a natural environment in which nancially distressed operates. In such an
environment, rms can use the structure of the reorganization proposal, in
particular the split between short term cash and deferred payments, to signal
their level of viability to uninformed unsecured creditors. Using a two-period
model, it is shown that with symmetric information, rms reorganizing post-
pone all payments to creditors until the second period. In an environment
characterized by asymmetric information, under the assumption that the
marginal cost of short term cash payments is less for more ecient than for
less ecient rms, a separating equilibrium arises in which cash payments are
1
See Aghion, Hart & Moore (1992), Bebchuk (1988), Bradley & Rosenzweig (1992),
Fisher & Martel (1994a), Martel (1994b), Rasmussen (1992), Roe (1983) and White (1994).
2
Canadian data shows that the default rate on accepted proposals is about 30%. Recent
U.S. data shows that more than 40% of Chapter 11 cases are failures (Jensen-Conklin
1992).
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used by more ecient rms to separate themselves from less ecient rms.
In addition, it is shown that there exists no pooling equilibria in which rms
of dierent types oer the same contract with no short term cash payments
which satises the Intuitive criteria. Under the opposite assumption with
respect to the marginal costs of short term cash payments, it is shown that
the previous separating equilibrium is also an equilibrium of the reorganiza-
tion game but that pooling equilibria, in which at least two dierent types
of rms oer the same contract whith no short term cash payments, can also
arise in equilibrium. Finally, the model conrms the occurence of ltering
failures in bankruptcy.
The second contribution of the article is to test the predictions of the
model with an original data set of 393 commercial reorganization proposals
led at the two largest bankruptcy oces in Canada (Montreal and Toronto)
between 1977 and 1988. The empirical analysis conrmsmany important fea-
tures of the model. First, the probability of success of a proposal increases
with the proportion of rst period payments to creditors, after controlling for
the cash-ow constraint. This is consistent with the view that cash payments
have a signaling role in reorganization. Second, the probability of success of
a proposal decreases with the number of periods over which installments are
made. Third, the probability of acceptance of a proposal increases signi-
cantly with the perceived probability of success of the proposal by unsecured
creditors.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
model of nancial reorganization and Section 3 summarizes its empirical
implications. Section 4 discusses the econometric technique used to estimate
the model. Finally, Sections 5 and 6 present the preliminary data analysis
and the estimation results respectively.
I. The Reorganization Game
Consider a two-period model with a risk neutral rm in nancial distress
which needs to reorganize its debt with unsecured creditors and nd new bank
nancing. At period 1, the rm, which has a net cash-ow of S
1
, equal to the
value of tangible assets, nancial slack and a bank loan which has absolute
priority over unsecured debt, and which faces an investment opportunity,
oers a new nancial contract to unsecured creditors and chooses a level of
2
investment, x. The contract species a rst and a second period payment,
(P
1
; P
2
), with P
2
being contingent on the success of the investment project.
If unsecured creditors, who are assumed to be identical, reject the proposal,
the rm is declared bankrupt and the assets are liquidated and distributed
according to the absolute priority rule. If they accept, the rm obtains the
loan previously negotiated with the bank and invests an amount x, which
generates revenues of x+  in the second period, where  is a depreciation
factor on the investment. Since investment is contingent on the extension of
the bank loan and a reduction of the unsecured debt, the basic problem of
the rm is then one of cash-ow in the rst period. The contract (P
1
; P
2
) is
binding on the rm and cannot be renegotiated once it is rejected or accepted.
Any default on the terms of the contract entails liquidation.
The private information on the rm's type, parameterized by t, is exoge-
nously given. The stochastic parameter  has support [0;

] and a probability
distribution F (jx; t), which depends on the rm's type and on the level of
investment.
3
This model, which considers the relationship between the rm and its
unsecured creditors at the time of nancial reorganization, is characterized
by two important features. First, the rm has negotiated a new loan or a
loan extension with the bank prior to an agreement with unsecured credi-
tors. Although the loan can be observable, creditors cannot infer all useful
information with respect to the future protability of the rm's investment
project.
4
This structure is justied on the basis that banks play only an
indirect role in a court supervised reorganization and is mostly restricted to
the renewal or extension of the existing loans.
5
As suggested by Bulow &
Shoven (1978), the role of banks in the renancing of insolvent rms takes
all its importance at a stage prior to nancial reorganization, namely when
a rm has to decide between liquidation, continuance and reorganization.
Second, the rm's own cash-ow and the new bank loan are insucient
to invest rst best the optimal level of investment (i.e. S
1
(t) < x

(t)), which
3
The dependence of F (j) on x(t) is explained by the fact that the level of investment
aects the probability of success in reorganization.
4
Empirical evidence supporting the positive signaling role played by the renewal of
bank loans, in particular when the rm is in nancial distress, have been provided by
Chemmanur & Fulghieri (1994), Fisher & Martel (1995), Lummer & McConnell (1989)
and James (1986).
5
See Martel (1991) and Fisher & Martel (1995, 1994a) for Canadian evidence.
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justies the need for unsecured debt reorganization. The constrained level of
investment is denoted x(t). This premise is justied on the basis that rms
with internal cash constraints and low levels of collateral have limited access
to debt markets.
6
In addition, small rms in nancial distress may encounter
greater diculty in raising capital because of the heightened informational
asymmetry between the rm and the creditors.
7
Empirically, this view is
supported by the ndings of Fisher & Martel (1994b) and Martel (1994a)
who have shown that there is very little free assets to secure new loans at the
time of reorganization, which imposes a constraint on the amount the rm
can borrow.
The expected payo of the rm and the creditors in nancial reorganiza-
tion, net of their expected payo in liquidation, are:
(P
1
; P
2
; B
2
; S
1
; x; jt; C) = S
1
 P
1
 x+
Z


B
2
+P
2
 x
(x+ B
2
 P
2
) dF (jx; t)(1)
 (P
1
; P
2
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2
; xjt; C) = P
1
+
Z
P
2
+B
2
 x
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2
 x
[x+    B
2
] dF (jx; t)
+
Z


P
2
+B
2
 x
P
2
dF (jx; t)  C (2)
where:
C : expected liquidation payo on unsecured claims;
B
2
: bank loan to be reimbursed in period 2.
It is assumed that there are three types of rms, that is an inecient rm,
NV , and two ecient rms, L and H, with H having better future prospects
than L in reorganization.
8
For simplicity, the interest rate is assumed to be
zero. Also, the payo on unsecured claims in liquidation, C, is strictly greater
than zero, independent of the rm's type and can take two values from the
6
See Whited (1992), Myers (1984) and Gertler (1988).
7
See Opler & Titman (1994).
8
The terms inecient and ecient rms refer to rms which should be shut down
and which should continue operating respectively. These terms are borrowed from White
(1994).
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unsecured creditors' perspective: a low value, C, or a high value, C.
9
The
rm does not know the creditors' valuation of C when oering the contract
and they assign a probability q to a high valuation and a probability (1  q)
to a low valuation by creditors. The upper and lower limits of the integral
are determined by the absolute priority rule in bankruptcy. For instance,
the rm can only make positive prots in period 2 after paying for its bank
loan and unsecured claims. Similarly, the payment to unsecured creditors is
a function of the state of the world. They receive any amount exceeding the
bank loan when B
2
  x <  < P
2
+ B
2
  x while they receive the full
payment, P
2
when P
2
+B
2
  x <  <

.
We impose the following additional assumptions:
Assumption 1 F (jx;H) < F (jx;L) < F (jx;NV )
Assumption 2 F (jx = 0; t) = 1 8 > 0 and 8t
Assumption 3 F
x
(jx;NV ) < F
x
(jx;L) < F
x
(jx;H) < 0
Assumption 1 states that a more ecient rm has a greater probability
of success than a less ecient rm in reorganization. Assumption 2 implies
that the project fails if the rm does not invest in the rst period. Finally,
assumption 3 states that the marginal eect of the rm's investment in pe-
riod 1 on the distribution function of , is larger, in absolute value, for less
ecient than more ecient rms. The intuition behind this assumption is
the following. As previously mentioned, the basic problem faced by rms at
the beginning of reorganization is one of cash-ow. In this context, one would
want to leave the rm with a high enough level of cash in order to maximize
its chances of successfully reorganizing. Given that more ecient rms have,
by assumption, a higher probability of success, relaxing the cash constraint
on the less ecient rms should have a larger marginal eect. This also
means that rst period payments to unsecured creditors are marginally less
costly for more ecient rms than for less ecient rms. The implications
of this assumption on the equilibrium outcome of the game are discussed
later in the paper. In particular, the impact of an alternative specication is
examined.
9
C is dened as the value of C such that (P
1
; P
2
; ; tj C) < 0 for inecient rms and
(P
1
; P
2
; ; tj C)  0 for ecient rms while C is dened as the value of C such that
(P
1
; P
2
; ; tj C)  0 for all rms.
5
The outcome of the game depends on the information structure between
the rm and the creditors.
A. Symmetric Information
With symmetric information, the rm's type, t, and the unsecured creditors'
valuation of the liquidation value of the rm is common knowledge to all
parties. The optimal contract and investment level is the solution to the
following maximization problem
10
:
max
P
1
;P
2
;x
(P
1
; P
2
; B
2
; S
1
; xjt; C) (3)
subject to:
S
1
  P
1
  x  0 (4)
,(P
1
; P
2
; B
2
; xjt; C)  0 (5)
P
1
 0; P
2
 0; x  0 (6)
The rst constraint species that the amount invested cannot exceed the
net cash-ow available to the debtor in period 1 while the second constraint
represents the creditors' participation constraint in reorganization. The last
three constraints ensure that unsecured creditors receive a non-negative pay-
ment on their original claims and that the investment level is non-negative.
11
Proposition 1 The following allocation corresponds to an equilibrium of the
reorganization game with symmetric information:
(i) Firm NV liquidates.
(ii) Firms L and H reorganize.
10
The choice variables are a function of the rm's type. We omit the reference to t for
simplicity.
11
The non-negativity constraints on the payment to creditor are not inconsistent with
the fact that creditors can keep on doing business with the rm; an activity which is
typically associated with a negative payment to creditors over a short period of time
(often over a period 60 or 90 days). New claims acquired after reorganization are simply
treated independently of the proposed payment in reorganization.
6
(iii) P
1
(t) = 0 for t = L;H.
(iv) The expected return to unsecured creditors in reorganization, for each
type of rms, is equal to their expected return in liquidation.
(v) x(t) = x(t) = S
1
(t) for t = L;H.
(vi) Creditors reject the oer if and only if ,(0; P
2
; B
2
; xjt; C) < 0.
The solution to this problem can be found in the Appendix. Given that
the rm's type is common knowledge, the inecient rm liquidates its as-
sets while ecient rms opt for reorganization. For liquidity reasons, the
level of investment is contingent on the type of contract oered to unse-
cured creditors. Since rst period payments conveys no information about
the rm's viability to uninformed creditors, investment and prots are max-
imized when they are set equal to zero and all payments are postponed to
the second period.
B. Asymmetric Information
In more realistic cases, unsecured creditors have less information than the
rm about the rm's ongoing viability and the bank loan is not fully reveal-
ing. Since the rm has some private information about its own viability at
the time of negotiation, the reorganization contract may convey information
to creditors about its type. Knowing this, creditors may use this informa-
tion to form beliefs about the rm's type. A more ecient rm then has an
incentive to use the contract to separate itself from a less ecient rm and
self-selection can occur through the use of the rst period payment, P
1
.
Lemma 1 In the fP
1
; P
2
g space, ,(P
1
; P
2
= 0jt) = ,(P
1
; P
2
= 0jt+ 1) = C.
In addition, in the fP
1
; P
2
g space, ,(P
1
; P
2
jt) lies to the right of
,(P
1
; P
2
jt+ 1); 8 P
2
> 0 and 8 x  0
Lemma 1 states that the creditors' participation constraints based on the
beliefs that they face a type NV , L or H rm cross at the same point at the
origin since the liquidation payo to unsecured creditors, C, is independent
of t. In addition, for a given P
2
> 0, a lower type rm must oer a larger
P
1
than a higher type rm in order to satisfy the creditors' participation
constraint.
7
The equilibria of the game depend on the so-called single-crossing property.
12
The next lemma shows that this property is satised in the fP
1
; P
2
g space.
Lemma 2 In the fP
1
; P
2
g space, the single-crossing property for the rm is
satised.
The solution to the signaling game is described by the concept of Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in pure strategies. A PBE of the signaling game
species, for each type, a couple fP
1
; P
2
g tendered by the rm. A strategy
by the unsecured creditors is an acceptance rule that maps fP
1
; P
2
g into an
acceptance decision and a system of beliefs updated by Bayes Rule when-
ever possible along the equilibrium path.
13
Sequential rationality implies
that their strategies are rational given their beliefs and that their beliefs are
consistent with the others' strategies. There exists a continuum of Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium for this game depending on the structure of beliefs o
the equilibrium path. The structure of the equilibrium is the following:
Proposition 2 The following allocation corresponds to a PBE of the reor-
ganization game:
(i) Firm NV liquidates if q = 1 and reorganizes if q < 1 with an oer of
(P
1
; P
2
) such that ,(P
1
; P
2
jt; C) = 0 and P
1
(NV ) = 0.
(ii) Firms L and H reorganize for all values of q and oer a contract
(P
1
; P
2
) such that ,(P
1
; P
2
jt; C) = 0 if q > q

where q

is such that
(P
1
; P
2
jt; C) = (P
1
; P
2
jt; C). Otherwise, (P
1
; P
2
) is such that
,(P
1
; P
2
jt; C) = 0.
(iii) The expected return to unsecured creditors in reorganization, for each
type of rms, is equal to their expected return in liquidation; i.e. Let's
dene the function P

2
(P
1
; t) such that ,(P
1
; P

2
(P
1
; t)jC) = 0, 8 P
1
and t, then P
2
(t) = P

2
(P
1
; t) for all rms in reorganization.
(iv) P
1
(L) = 0 if q > q

and P
1
(H) is the value of P
1
(H) > P
1
(L), with
P
1
(H) > 0, which solves (P
1
; P

2
(P
1
;H); L) = (P
1
(L); P
2
(L); L).
Otherwise, P
1
(L) > 0 and P
1
(L) is the value of P
1
(L) > P
1
(NV ) which
12
See Cooper (1984).
13
See Fudenberg & Tirole (1991).
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solves (P
1
; P

2
(P
1
; L); NV ) = (P
1
(NV ); P
2
(NV ); NV ) and P
1
(H) >
0 and is the value of P
1
(H) > P
1
(L) which solves (P
1
; P

2
(P
1
;H); L) =
(P
1
(L); P
2
(L); L).
(v) Creditors reject the oer if and only if ,(P
1
; P
2
; tjC) < 0.
(vi) x(t) = x(t) = S
1
(t)  P
1
(t) for all rms in reorganization.
For ease of presentation, the solution to this game is depicted in two
gures. Figure 1(a) illustrates the case of an inecient, NV , and an ecient
rm, L, while Figure 1(b) illustrates the case of two ecient rms, L and
H.
14
In Figure 1(a), rm NV liquidates if q = 1, since there are no mutually
benecial contract between the rm and its creditors. To deter NV from
deviating from its equilibrium strategy, rm L oers contract B with P
1
(L) >
0. Creditors accept L's oer irrespective of their true valuation of C. If
q = 0, rms NV and L reorganize and oer contract A, with P
1
(NV ) = 0,
and contract D, with P
1
(L) > 0, respectively. Creditors accept the oers if
their true valuation of the assets is equal to C and reject otherwise. However,
unlike rm NV which oers contract A for any value of 0 < q < 1, rm L
can take a chance an oer contract D which provides for a lower P
1
and
higher payos but also with a lower probability of acceptance by creditors
than contract B. As a result, the reorganization contract of an ecient rm
can be rejected in equilibrium.
The same analysis applies to two ecient rms where the rms L and H
can oer the contract A and B respectively which are accepted with proba-
bility one by creditors or oer the contract E and D which are accepted with
a probability of less than one. The choice of a contract by rms L and H
reects the trade-o between a higher rst period payment, associated with
a higher probability of acceptance of a plan, and a lower cash-ow and total
payos. This is illustrated in Figure 1(b). This analysis supports White's
(1994) and Fisher & Martel's (1995) results with respect to the occurence of
ltering failures in bankrupcty.
Proposition 3 There exists no pooling equilibrium outcomes of the reorga-
nization game, with all types of rms oering P
1
= 0, which satises the
Intuitive criterion.
15
14
See the Appendix for a complete proof.
15
See Cho & Kreps (1987)
9
Proposition 3 can be demonstrated using Figure 2 which considers two ef-
cient rms for C = C.
16
Let fP
1
(p); P
2
(p)g be the pooling contract such that

0
,(P
1
(p); P
2
(p); xjH) + (1   
0
) ,(P
1
(p); P
2
(p); xjL) = C, where 
0
is the
creditors' prior belief that the rm is of type H. The creditors' participation
constraint is represented by the indierence curve ,
P
. Contract A represents
a pooling equilibrium and is supported by the beliefs that (LjP
1
> 0) = 1.
Now consider contract B which is strictly preferred by type H to contract
A. Then, the Intuitive criterion requires that the creditors should assign a
probability equal to one that this contract is oered by type H since type L's
prots are lower if it deviates. Hence, type H oers contract B and creditors
accept, thus upsetting the equilibrium.
The outcomes of the reorganization game in Propositions 2 and 3 are de-
rived under assumption 3 which states that the marginal eect of investment
is larger for the lower type than for the higher type rms. The next propo-
sition characterizes the outcome of the game with the opposite assumption.
Proposition 4 If F
x
(jx;H) < F
x
(jx;L) < F
x
(jx;NV ) < 0, the Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium in Proposition 2 is also a separating equilibrium of the
signaling game.
Proposition 5 If F
x
(jx;H) < F
x
(jx;L) < F
x
(jx;NV ) < 0, there exists
no pooling equilibrium outcomes of the reorganization game, with all types
oering P
1
> 0, which satises the Intuitive criterion.
In Figure 3, let the candidate pooling equilibrium with P
1
> 0 be rep-
resented by contract E. Consider an alternative contract such as D with
P
1
= 0. According to the Intuitive criterion, creditors should assign a prob-
ability equal to one that contract D originates from the type H rm since
type L would lower its prot if it deviates. Therefore, H oers contract D,
creditors accept, thus upsetting the equilibrium. The intuition behind these
two propositions is very simple.
17
In an environment characterized by cash
constraints and asymmetric information on the rms' viability, there are po-
tential gains to signaling for the higher type rm. However, in the event that
the marginal return to holding additional cash for investment is signicantly
larger for the higher type than for the lower rm, the gains from signaling
16
The same analysis applies when considering an inecient and an ecient rm.
17
See the Appendix for the proof.
10
disappear and both types oer the same contract with a rst period payment
equal to zero.
These results can be compared to those of White (1994) and Giammarino
(1989) who show that pooling equilibria in which insolvent and solvent rms
oer the same contract in equilibrium can arise in the context of nancial
rerganization with asymmetric information. According to White, creditors
cannot infer the rm's type from the form of payments when both types
of rms benet from pooling rather than separating. The signaling model
presented in this paper supports this view only when the marginal costs of
cash payments is signicantly inferior for lower type than for higher type
rms. Otherwise, the structure of payments specied in the reorganization
contract carries information to creditors about the rms' viability and are
used by more ecient rms accordingly. However, contrary to White's model
which assumes that the payments to creditors under a low-payment proposal
is made as a lump-sum following the approval of the plan, the present model
derives endogenously the structure of the reorganization contract. Since a
priori, it is not clear which view is the most appropriate, an empirical analysis
of the behaviour of rms and creditors in reorganization can shed some light
on that debate. This is the object of the next sections.
II. Empirical Implications
The reorganization procedure is a two-stage game. At stage one, debtors
submit a proposal to unsecured creditors for their approval.
18
At stage two,
an accepted proposal can either be a success or a failure.
19
The model pre-
sented in this paper generates empirical implications with respect to each of
these two stages.
The probability of success in reorganization:
1. decreases with the proportion of rst period cash payments in the con-
text of symmetric information;
20
18
There is a stage prior to the creditors' vote, that is the rm's choice between liquidation
and reorganization. It is outside the scope of this study.
19
A proposal is a success when all the terms of the original agreement have been met
and the trustee is discharged.
20
The impact of P
1
is derived in the presence of cash constraint on rms in
reorganization.
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2. increases with the proportion of rst period cash payments in the con-
text of asymmetric information;
3. increases with the rm's cash-ow level at the beginning of reorganiza-
tion.
The probability of acceptance of a reorganization proposal by unsecured
creditors:
1. increases with the perceived probability of success of the proposal;
2. increases with the proportion of rst period cash payments;
3. increases with the proposed payment in reorganization;
21
4. decreases with the expected payment on unsecured claims in liquida-
tion.
III. Parametric Analysis of Reorganization
The creditors' decision to accept or reject a reorganization proposal depends,
among other factors, on its perceived probability of success. Following Mc-
Fadden's (1981) random utility model, let y

ij
be the expected level of indirect
utility of creditor i in alternative j. We can write:
y

ij
= 
0
~p(x
ij
) + 
0
j
z
i
+ 
ij
(7)
where ~p(x
ij
) is the creditor's perceived probability of success and z
i
is a
vector of measured characteristics for creditor i. Since y

ij
is unobservable,
the choice rule is the following:
y
ij
= 1 if y

ij
> y

ik
8 k 6= j
y
ij
= 0 otherwise
The probability that a proposal is accepted and successful can be written
as:
P
ij
= Prob(y
ij
= 1) =
exp[
0
~p
ij
+ 
0
j
z
i
]
1 + exp[
0
~p
ik
+ 
0
k
z
i
]
(8)
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This is the total payment unadjusted for risk.
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However equation (8) cannot be estimated since the probability of success
is not observable. Assuming that this probability is a linear function of a
number of factors, we can write:
~p
ij
= 
0
j
x
ij
+ 
ij
(9)
Although ~p
ij
is unobservable, we can dene a variable s such that:
s
ij
= 1 if the proposal is successful
s
ij
= 0 otherwise
and the probability of success of a proposal can be written as:
p
ij
= Prob(s
ij
= 1) =
exp[
0
j
x
ij
]
1 + exp[
0
j
x
ij
]
(10)
Assuming weak exogeneity for ~p, a two-step procedure is used to estimate
the model.
22
First, we estimate equation (10) with a logit model. The param-
eter estimates of (9) are then used to calculate a predicted probability of suc-
cess for each proposal in the sample. Finally, equation (8) is estimated with
the predicted probability of success and other measured characteristics.
23
IV. Preliminary Data Analysis
Each reorganization proposal made under the Canadian Bankruptcy Act is
led with one of 15 regional bankruptcy oces of Industry & Science Canada.
The data used for this study originate from individual reorganization les
led at the Montreal and Toronto regional oces during the period 1977-
1987. From a population of 1280 commercial proposals, a random sample of
500 les was selected.
24
Due to the presence of some consumer proposals,
22
Weak exogeneity assumes the independence of the error terms 
ij
and 
ij
. This
procedure is less ecient but provides consistent estimates. See Engle, Hendry & Richard
(1983).
23
See Maddala (1983). Estimation is performed using Version 7.0 of SHAZAM.
24
Random sampling was carried out using the Systematic Random Sampling Procedure.
The sample is chosen to be representative of the regional distribution of bankruptcies and
proposals over the years.
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commercial bankruptcies or the absence of key information in the les, the
nal sample has 393 proposals, of which 273 are from Montreal and 120 are
from Toronto.
Table I oers a condensed description of the characteristics of rms in
nancial reorganization.
25
Canadian rms ling a proposal are relatively
small, with an average value of assets of $2.45 million and an average value
of liabilities of $2.98 million.
26
About 72% of the rms in the sample have
a real value of assets less than $1 million. More than 60% of total liabilities
are unsecured while secured and preferred debt represent respectively 32%
and 6% of total debts. On average, there are 110 creditors involved in a
reorganization proposal; the majority, 84%, being unsecured creditors.
Firms in reorganization oer a mean payo rate of 38.2 cents on the dollar
on unsecured claims.
27
On average, 7.2 % of the proposed payo is paid in
cash up-front, 91.1 % is paid in cash installments and 1.6 % is paid in equity
in the rm.
28
Installment payments are paid in 3 separate installments which
are spread over a mean period of 14 months. The gross expected payo to
unsecured creditors in a liquidation is estimated at 7.2%.
29
It takes, on average, 50 days before creditors can take the nal vote of
a proposal and the the acceptance rate by unsecured creditors is 74.8%.
Of these accepted proposals, more than 70% are successful, that is all the
terms of the proposals are met by the debtor before the trustee is discharged.
Therefore, the probability that a rm ling for a proposal will be successful
in reorganization is about 53%.
Table II reveals some important stylized facts on the payo to unse-
cured creditors. First, the proposed payo in reorganization is higher for
accepted than for rejected proposals while the expected liquidation payo
25
See Martel (1994a) for a detailed description of the sample.
26
All dollar gures are reported in thousands of June 1993 Canadian dollars, deated
by the GDP deator (Series D20556).
27
The non-discounted payo rate to unsecured creditors originates from the debtors'
proposal to creditors.
28
Cash up-front payments are dened as cash payments made within strictly less than
one month of the court's approval. Only four proposals provided for equity payments.
29
The gross expected payo in liquidation is dened as ((0.5 * book value of assets) -
secured claims - preferred claims) / unsecured claims. This represents an upper bound
on the payment unsecured creditors anticipate receiving in liquidation since it is gross of
administration costs. Given the absence of information on the ratio of market to book
value of assets, a value of 0.5 was used.
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rate to unsecured creditors is higher for rejected than for accepted proposals.
These conrm the larger net gain for accepted than for rejected proposals.
Second, the proportion of short term payments, whether dened as the pro-
portion of payments paid up-front, within one month, three months and six
months from approval, is signicantly higher for successful as compared to
non-successful proposals. This stylized fact is well summarized in Figure 4
which shows that, on average, successful proposals provide for a higher ex
ante proposed payment than non successful proposals, as expressed by the
net gain line, with the peak being between three and nine months from con-
rmation. These ndings provide preliminary support for the signaling role
of short term payments in reorganization.
V. Results
The data allow for several measures of the rst period payments which can
be measured as the proportion of payments made upon court's approval, or
the proportion of payments made within one month, three or six months of
court's approval. These alternative specications are all tested. Given the
absence of data on the rms' cash-ow, the proportion of government claims
in total liabilities is used as a proxy.
30
The reason for using this variable is
that, in reorganization, government claims have to be fully reimbursed upon
the court's approval, which reduces the cash-ow of the rm.
31
In addition, a
high level of proportion of government claims can denote recurrent cash-ow
problems and the fact that the rm has been negotiating with the government
an informal rescheduling of its claims over the years prior to reorganization.
32
A negative coecient for this variable would support the conjecture that the
rms are cash constrained at the beginning of reorganization. In reorga-
nization, uncertainty increases with the number of installments required to
reimburse the creditors. The number of installments specied in the proposal
30
Government claims refer to claims for source deductions, sales and corporate taxes
and customs fees, etc.
31
The 1992 reform to the Bankruptcy Act changed the status of government claims in
reorganization. Although this model is inspired by the regime prevailing prior to 1992,
these institutional changes do not alter the structure of the model. See Martel (1994b)
and Fisher & Martel (1994a) for a discussion of the bankruptcy reform.
32
Government claims in proportion of total liabilities is used to control for rm size
eects and to reduce the sensitivity of the estimates to extreme values.
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is used to capture this eect. To control for the rms' relative nancial sit-
uation, the assets to liabilities ratio is used. Dummy variables to control for
corporations, region and industries are also used.
Table III lists the results from the logit estimation of the success inci-
dence equation.
33
The estimation results show that the probability of suc-
cess increases with the proportion of rst period payments as measured by
the proportion of payments paid within six months of court's approval.
34
The interesting feature about this result is that rst period payments have
a larger eect when paid within a relatively short period of time than when
paid upon court's approval. This suggests that the possibility for the rm to
spread these payments over a few months gives it the additional breathing
space that is necessary to maximize its probability of success in reorganiza-
tion. One might argue that this eect is not a signaling eect but rather
a wealth eect whereby more viable rms simply have more cash than less
viable rms. This view is not supported by the empirical results since the
cash payments variable is signicant when controlling for the cash-ow eect,
as measured by government claims. Column 2 in Table V reports the results
from an alternative regression which controls for the proportion of free assets
in the rm shows that this variable does not have a signicant impact on the
probability of success of a proposal while the proportion of payments paid
within six months of court's approval is still signicant.
35
According to Col-
umn 3 of Table V, the proportion of free assets is even less signicant when
excluding the cash payments variable. These results supports the signaling
role played by the proportion of rst period cash payments in the presence
of asymmetric information.
36
33
The sample size is 244 proposals. For the purpose of estimation, we omitted les
with missing information on the value of assets and the number of installments. In cases
where the return (1 case) and the proportion of cash payments (9 cases) is unknown,
it has been set to zero on the grounds that this is the worst creditors can expect. An
alternative regression where les with unknown return and payments are rejected yields
similar results.
34
The proportion of payments made at three months from the court's approval also have
a positive and signicant eect while the proportion of payments made upon approval or
after one month of approval have a positive but non-signicant eect.
35
The proportion of free assets is dened as ((assets - secured claims) / assets). Negative
values have been set to zero. Although being an imperfect measure of cash, the proportion
of free assets is certainly positively correlated with the amount of liquid assets.
36
One can also argue that the use of cash payments may simply result from the presence
16
The negative coecient of the proportion of government claims estima-
tor conrms the view that rms in reorganization are cash constrained even
following an extension of the bank loan. These claims impose a burden on
the rms' cash-ow at the beginning of reorganization and reduce their like-
lihood of success. This also supports the view expressed earlier with respect
to the limited access to debt markets for small rms. Proposals with pay-
ments spread over many installments are less likely to be successful, which
provides evidence that the uncertainty reduces the likelihood of success of
a reorganization proposal. The assets to liabilities ratio has a positive and
signicant coecient which supports the view that rms in relatively bet-
ter nancial health are more likely to succeed in reorganization. Relative to
Toronto, reorganization proposals led in Montreal are less likely to be suc-
cessful. Corporate proposals are not estimated to have signicantly dierent
success probability than non-corporate proposals. Finally, there are no statis-
tically signicant dierences in the probability of success across industries.
37
A likelihood-ratio test cannot reject the hypothesis that the industry coe-
cients are jointly equal to zero with a 
2
test statistics of 4.73 with 5 degrees
of freedom.
38
Similarly, we reject the hypothesis that the probability of suc-
cess is determined by the dummy variables only with a 
2
test statistics of
24.46 with 4 degrees of freedom.
39
Using the estimated coecients, a predicted probability of success is com-
puted for each proposal in the sample which is then compared to the observed
probability of success. The model predicts that expected probability of suc-
cess is 73.77 percent for accepted proposals and 67.20 percent for rejected
proposals. This conrms that rejected proposals have a lower expected prob-
ability of success ex ante.
The creditors' decision in reorganization is based on their participation
constraint. We examine the impact of the proportion of rst period pay-
ments, the perceived probability of success of the proposal, the total pay-
of a large individual creditor having a potential veto right on the approval of the proposal.
The micro-data on rms which had their reorganization proposals accepted shows that
this is not the case since the number of proposals involving a large individual ordinary
creditor (with more than 25% of the ordinary claims) is not statistically (at the 5% level)
dierent when comparing successful and unsuccessful proposals.
37
These ve industries were selected according to their relative importance in the sample.
38
The critical value is 11.07 at the 5 percent level.
39
The critical value is 9.49 and 13.28 at the 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
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ment in reorganization and the expected payo in liquidation. To examine
the eect of delays in the reorganization procedure, a variable measuring
the time between ling and voting is added to the list of explanatory vari-
ables. Bargaining between the rm and creditors is captured by the number
of amendments to the proposal. The estimation also includes a variable mea-
suring the proportion of secured claims in total claims to examine the implicit
role of banks in reorganization [Fisher & Martel (1995)]. The change in the
unemployment rate over the six months prior to the creditors' decision is
used as a proxy for the business climate just prior to reorganization. Since,
the voting rule gives a veto right to any unsecured creditor having more than
25% of unsecured claims, a dummy variable is used to control for the pres-
ence of a large unsecured creditor. A dummy variable for holding proposals
is used to control for additional uncertainty from the creditors' perspective.
40
Table IV presents the results from the logit estimation of the acceptance
incidence equation.
41
As predicted by the model, the perceived probability of
success of a proposal plays a key role in the creditor's decision. An increase in
the perceived probability of success increases the likelihood of acceptance of
a proposal. The estimation results conrm that the probability of acceptance
increases with the proportion of rst period payments as measured by the
proportion of payments made within one month of the court's approval, after
controlling for the eect of short-term payments on the probability of success.
This result illustrates the trade-o involved in using cash payments. From the
creditors' perspective, short term payments have a greater impact when paid
very shortly following the court's approval while from the rm's perspective,
they have a greater impact on the probability of success if spread over a
reasonably short period of time. These results conrm the recent ndings of
Fisher & Martel (1995) who provide evidence that proposals oering higher
short term cash payments are more likely to be accepted and to succeed.
40
A holding proposal is an interim document requiring more time to prepare a nal
proposal.
41
The sample size is 384 proposals. For the purpose of estimation, we omitted les
with missing information on the value of assets, the number of amendments and the time
between ling and voting. One le with an exceptionally long period between ling and
voting (1681 days) is also deleted. In cases where the proposed reorganization payment
(35 cases) and the proportion of short term payments (84 cases) are unknown, they have
been set to zero. An alternative regression where the cases with unknown return and
payment are rejected yields similar results.
18
Contrary to expectation, although coecients for the expected payo in
liquidation and the non-discounted proposed payo in reorganization have
the right signs, they do not have signicant impact on the probability of
acceptance. However, a likelihood-ratio test rejects the hypothesis that the
parameters of the participation constraint variables are jointly equal to zero
with a 
2
test statistics of 15.78 with 4 degrees of freedom.
42
Although these
results contrast with those of Fisher & Martel (1995) who nd a signicant
eect of these two variables on the probability of acceptance in reorganiza-
tion, an alternative specication in which the acceptance stage of the game
is estimated indepently yields similar results to those nd by these authors.
The probability of acceptance also increases with the number of amend-
ments to the proposal, which conrms the positive impact of successful nego-
tiation prior to the vote.
43
The change in the unemployment rate over the six
months prior to voting is estimated to aect negatively the acceptance prob-
ability, suggesting that the behaviour of creditors is pro-cyclical. Holding
proposals are also less likely to be accepted. The results provide only weak
evidence for Fisher & Martel's (1995) ndings with respect to the positive
signaling role played by secured creditors in reorganization. The coecient of
the estimator for the ratio of secured claims to total claims is positive but not
signicantly dierent than zero. The same is true for the variable measuring
for the time between ling and voting. According to Fisher & Martel, an
increase in the time period between ling and voting reduces the likelihood
of acceptance of a proposal while the present results suggests that, although
the coecient of the estimator being negative, the eect is not signicantly
dierent than zero. Finally, the presence of a large unsecured creditor does
not have a statistically signicant impact on the vote. A likelihood-ratio test
rejects the hypothesis that all the parameters except those for the dummy
variables are jointly equal to zero with a 
2
test statistics of 49.92 with 8
42
These variables are the expected payo in liquidation, the payo in reorganization,
the proportion of payments within one month and the proposal's perceived probability of
success. The critical value is 9.49 and 13.38 at the 5 and 1 percent level.
43
37% of the proposals in the sample have been amended at least once by unsecured
creditors. Typically, an amendment aims at increasing the proposed payo rate on un-
secured claims. The observance of an amendment conrms the successful negotiation
between unsecured creditors and the debtor over the provisions of the initial proposal.
However, the non-observance of an amendment is not informative of whether or not there
were negotiations between the two parties prior to the vote.
19
degrees of freedom.
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VI. Conclusion
This paper proposes a signaling model of nancial reorganization which ex-
ploits the structure of the reorganization contract between the rm and cred-
itors. The model focuses on situations in which the rm's own nancial slack
and the extension of the original bank loan are insucient to attain the rst-
best level of investment, and there is asymmetric information with respect to
the rm's level of viability. This environment is argued to a natural one for
rms in nancial reorganization. Under this setting, it is shown that there
exists a separating equilibrium in which rms use the provisions of the reor-
ganization contract to signal their type to uninformed creditors who can then
update their beliefs on the rm's likelihood of success in reorganization and
vote accordingly on the proposal. This article has also shown that pooling
equilibria, in which rms of dierent types oer the same contract, can arise
in reorganization.
In an attempt to discriminate between the possible outcomes of the game
and a number of predictions in the literature, a reduced form model of the
probability of success and of the probability of acceptance of proposals was
estimated with an original data set of commercial reorganization proposals
led in Canada between 1977 and 1987. The empirical analysis conrms that
rst period payments are used by rms to convey information to unsecured
creditors and that rms in reorganization face liquidity constraints. In the
creditors' participation in reorganization is determined by the proportion of
rst period payments, the perceived probability of success of the reorganiza-
tion proposal and the extent of bargaining with the rm.
From a public policy perspective, the importance of the liquidity con-
straint and the use of rst period payments provides additional evidence
against the priority granted to government claims in reorganization. By
granting itself such a priority, the government reduces the chances of nan-
cially distressed rms to reorganize successfully which increases the likelihood
of ltering failures in bankruptcy.
44
The critical value is 15.51 and 20.09 at the 5 and 1 percent level.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
The rst order conditions of the rm's maximization problem are:
P
1
:  1  
1
+ 
2
 
P
1
+ 
3
= 0 (11)
P
2
: (1  
2
)
P
2
+ 
4
= 0 (12)
x : 
x
  
1
+ 
2
 
x
+ 
5
= 0 (13)
where 
3
,
4
and 
5
are the multipliers for the non-negativity constraints on
the choice variables.
If we suppose 
2
= 0, equation (12) simplies to 
P
2
+ 
4
= 0. Since

P
2
< 0 then 
4
> 0 which implies that P
2
= 0. Equation (11) also simplies
to 
3
= 1 + 
1
which implies that 
3
> 0 and P
1
= 0. However, we cannot
have P
1
and P
2
equal to zero at the same time so 
2
> 0 and the creditors'
participation constraint is binding in equilibrium.
We can now show that 
2
= 1. If we assume that 
2
> 1, then (1  

2
)
P
2
> 0, which is impossible since 
4
 0 and equation (12) can never
be satised. Similarly, if we assume that 
2
is between zero and one, (1  

2
)
P
2
< 0 which implies that 
4
> 0 and P
2
= 0. Equation (11) can be
rewritten as (
2
 1)+
3
= 
1
. Since the rst term is strictly negative, 
3
> 0
which implies that P
1
= 0. Again, this is impossible because we cannot have
P
1
and P
2
equal to zero at the same time. Therefore, 
2
= 1
In equation (13), we know that 
5
= 0 since we are considering situations
where x > 0. This equation simplies to 
x
+ ,
x
= 
1
. The left-hand side
of the equation represents the marginal condition on the investment level in
the absence of any constraint by the bank. We know by denition that the
loan constraint on the rm prevents the rm from attaining the rst best
level of investment in which case we have 
x
+,
x
> 0 since the value of the
rm is concave in x. Therefore, we conclude that 
1
> 0 and the investment
constraint is binding in equilibrium. From equation (11), we also conclude
that 
3
> 0 so that P
1
= 0.
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 1: Integrating by parts equation (2), the creditors' par-
ticipation constraint becomes:
 () = P
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+ P
2
 
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 x
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2
 x
F (jx; t)] d   C (14)
From equation (14), it is easy to see that P
1
(t) = P
1
(t + 1) = C when
P
2
(t) = P
2
(t+ 1) = 0. Similarly, for any P
2
> 0, we can write:
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Rearranging, we get:
[P
1
(t)  P
1
(t + 1)] + [P
2
(t)   P
2
(t + 1)] =
Z
P
2
+B
2
 x
B
2
 x
[F (jx; t)  F (jx; t+ 1)] d
We know from assumption 1 that F (jx; t) > F (jx; t+ 1) which implies
that the right-hand side of the equation is strictly greater than zero for any
P
2
> 0. Therefore, P
1
(t) > P
1
(t+ 1) for any P
2
> 0. Note that this result is
independent of the relative magnitude of the function F
x
(jx; t) across types.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: For a given contract fP
1
; P
2
g, and a given value of S
1
,
B
2
and t, the rm's prot function is dened as:
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Integrating by parts, we get:
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Z
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45
For simplicity, we assume that the rm's prot in period 1 is zero, which is the case
in equilibrium.
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I now compare the marginal rate of substitution between P
1
and P
2
, for two
types of rm, to verify the single-crossing property in the fP
1
; P
2
g subspace.
i) The slope of a rm's iso-prot curve in fP
1
; P
2
g subspace is:
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To compute the relative slope of both type's iso-prot curves for a given
contract fP
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g, we calculate
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Using assumptions 1 and 3, the rst term of the expression is greater than
one while the second term is less than one. Therefore, (dP
2
= dP
1
)
t+1
> (dP
2
= dP
1
)
t
.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2:
For any pair (P
1
; P
2
), the creditors assign a belief that t = NV if P
1
< P
1
(L),
that t = L if P
1
2 [P
1
(L); P
1
(H)) and that t = H if P
1
> P
1
(H). By construc-
tion, the proposed system of beliefs is consistent with Bayes rule. Further,
creditors accept the rm's take-it-or-leave-it oer if and only if, given their
belief about the rm's type, they expect non-negative payos. The creditors'
strategy in (v) is thus optimal given their beliefs. For some xed P
1
(t), the
rm t will oer the lowest acceptable P
2
, hence condition (iii).
Given the denition of C and C, the inecient rm, NV , cannot gain
by oering an acceptable contract to unsecured creditors when q = 1 and
can only gain by oering a reorganization contract (P
1
; P
2
) which satises
,(P
1
; P
2
jt; C) = 0 when q < 1, hence condition (i). Condition (iv) states
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that (P
1
(H); P
2
(H)jL;C) = (P
1
(L); P
2
(L)jL;C) when q > q

. When
P
1
(H) > P
1
(L), it implies from the single-crossing property that:
(P
1
(H); P
2
(H)jH;C)  (P
1
(L); P
2
(L)jH;C) and
(P
1
(H); P
2
(H)jL;C) = (P
1
(L); P
2
(L)jL;C). It follows that:
(P
1
(t); P
2
(t)jt; C)  (P
1
(l); P
2
(l)jt; C) for l and t = L;H.
Condition (iv) also states that (P
1
(L); P
2
(L)jNV;C) = (P
1
(NV ); P
2
(NV )jNV;C)
and (P
1
(H); P
2
(H)jL;C) = (P
1
(L); P
2
(L)jL;C) when q < q

. When
P
1
(L) > P
1
(NV ), it implies from the single-crossing property that:
(P
1
(L); P
2
(L)jL;C)  (P
1
(NV ); P
2
(NV )jL;C) and
(P
1
(L); P
2
(L)jNV;C) = (P
1
(NV ); P
2
(NV )jNV;C). It follows that:
(P
1
(t); P
2
(t)jt; C)  (P
1
(l); P
2
(l)jt; C) for l and t = NV;L.
Hence, among the set of all acceptable contracts, (P
1
(t); P
2
(t)) is the pre-
ferred contract for type t. So, condition (iv) implies that the strategy for
each rm is optimal given the creditors' response.
Irrespective of the creditors' valuation of the rm's assets, there always ex-
ists a mutually benecial contract between an ecient rm and unsecured
creditors. An ecient rm can then follow two strategies: (a) oer a con-
tract (P
1
; P
2
) such that ,(P
1
; P
2
jt; C) = 0 which is accepted by creditors
with a probability equal to one, or (b) oer a contract (P
1
; P
2
) such that
,(P
1
; P
2
jt; C) = 0 which is accepted by creditors with a probability less
than one. Comparing the rm's expected payo under both strategies, we
can compute the value of q

such that the rm is indierent between either
strategies, that is q

is such that (P
1
; P
2
jt; C) = (P
1
; P
2
jt; C). This is
condition (ii).
Finally, since F
x
(jt) < 0, rms in reorganization invests all their free cash-
ow, hence condition (vi).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Following Lemma 2, the relative slope of the iso-prot curves of rms t and
t+ 1 is determined by the sign of the following expression:
sign

[1  F (P
2
+ B
2
  xjx; t+ 1)]
[1  F (P
2
+ B
2
  xjx; t)]

 
8
<
:
R


B
2
+P
2
 x
F
x
(jx; t+ 1)] d
R


B
2
+P
2
 x
F
x
(jx; t)] d
9
=
;
Assuming that F
x
(j x; t+1) < F
x
(j x; t), the sign of d=dt[dP
2
=dP
1
] can
be greater, equal or less than zero. Let's examine the three possibilities in
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the case of two ecient rms.
Case 1: d=dt[dP
2
=dP
1
] > 0
The equilibrium corresponds to the PBE in Proposition 2. This result is
explained by the fact that the relative dierence in the marginal eect of in-
vestment on the probability of success, F
x
(j x; t) is not suciently large to
dominate the relative dierence in the probability of success between rms.
Therefore, although cash is more important to the higher type rm, it can
still separate from the lower type rm by oering a positive rst period pay-
ment to creditors.
Case 2: d=dt[dP
2
=dP
1
] < 0
This case is depicted in Figure 3. Under this scenario, the slope of the iso-
prot curve is smaller for type H than for type L. This is explained by the
fact that the relative dierence in the marginal eect of investment on the
probability of success is suciently large to dominate the relative dierence
in the probability of success between rms. Cash is more important to the
higher type rm and it cannot gain by separating and oering a positive rst
period payment to creditors. The equilibrium contract will be somewhere
along the segment AB.
Case 3: d=dt[dP
2
=dP
1
] = 0
In such a case, the iso-prot curves of rm L and H have the same slope
and the type L rm can always deviate and oer any contract that type
H would oer. The only equilibria which maximizes the rms' prots are
pooling equilibria with P
1
= 0. Segment AB represents the locus of pooling
equilibria and the equilibrium contract moves towards B as 
0
increases.
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TABLE I
Descriptive Statistics of Firms in Reorganization in Canada.
1
Variables Mean Median Standard Min Max
deviation
Total assets
2
2 453.309 350.874 19 674.204 0.00 385 765.05
Total liabilities 2 981.584 783.890 15 875.596 22.00 301 750.68
Secured claims 1 610.431 201.254 12 247.279 0.00 237 437.86
Unsecured claims 1 008.831 438.754 2 024.847 11.70 25 659.25
Preferred claims 111.459 23.744 321.962 0.00 4 653.79
Crown claims 76.137 15.094 204.747 0.00 2 424.72
Liabilities to assets ratio 16.005 1.767 211.130 0.44 4 100.00
Secured claims / total assets 0.781 0.539 3.372 0.00 65.00
Number of secured creditors 3.407 2.000 17.071 0.00 331.00
Number of unsecured creditors 86.489 59.000 98.178 2.00 834.00
Number of preferred creditors 20.122 3.000 65.731 0.00 826.00
Total number of creditors 110.100 68.000 141.540 4.00 1 257.00
Expected payo in liquidation
3
7.208 0.000 15.569 0.00 100.00
Payo in reorganization
4
38.157 30.000 28.143 0.00 124.00
Proportion of payments in cash 7.230 0.000 23.234 0.00 100.00
Proportion of payments by installment 91.141 100.000 25.885 0.00 100.00
Proportion of payments in equity 1.629 0.000 12.378 0.00 100.00
Number of installments 3.050 2.000 4.121 0.00 36.00
Period for repayment (months) 14.011 9.000 16.027 0.00 120.00
Time between ling and voting (days) 50.000 25.000 105.460 0.00 1631.00
Notes:
1. The sample size is 393 plans and the acceptance rate is 74.8% (294 of 393).
2. The total assets, total liabilities, and the claims variables are reported in thousands of June
1993 Canadian dollars, deated by the gdp deator (series D20556).
3. The expected payo in liquidation, the payo in reorganization and the payments variables
are reported in percentages.
4. Based on a sample of 356 proposals where the payment to unsecured creditors is given.
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TABLE II
Mean Returns and First Period Payments in Reorganization
1
Accepted Accepted Rejected
Success Failure
Payo in reorganization
2
36.9 37.2 36.7 28.4
% Up-front cash payments
3
9.2 0.9 7.1 4.0
% Payments  1 month 36.0 13.8 29.8 11.4
% Payments  3 months 52.2 22.4 44.0 24.2
% Payments  6 months 61.6 31.6 53.2 35.7
Expected payo in liquidation 7.7 6.2 7.0 7.7
Number of plans 206 79 294 99
Notes:
1. The payments have been set to zero when the values were unknown.
2. The payo in reorganization is signicantly higher (at the 5% level) for accepted proposals
compared to rejected proposals.
3. The payment variables are dened as a percentage of the payo in reorganization.
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TABLE III
Logit Estimates of the Probability of Success
1
Explanatory variable Mean Logit Change in
coecient
2
probability
3
Payments within 6 months / total payments 0.6415 1.3692

0.2649
(0.4524)
Number of installments 2.9877 -0.0733

-0.0142
(0.0365)
Government claims / total liabilities 0.0406 -4.5953

-0.8892
(2.3059)
Assets / liabilities 0.5489 0.8449

0.1635
(0.4831)
Montreal
4
0.6271 -1.0037

-0.2301
(0.3748)
Corporations 0.8279 -0.2051 -0.0416
(0.4643)
Metallic minerals & metal products 0.0533 -0.9037 -0.2051
(0.6889)
Construction & related activities 0.1516 -0.4168 -0.0881
(0.4623)
Communications 0.0574 1.2893 0.1731
(1.1046)
Accommodation, restaurant & recreation services 0.0615 -0.0987 -0.0195
(0.6769)
Consumer goods & services 0.2582 0.1402 0.0262
(0.4071)
Constant 1.1356

|
(0.6574)
Notes:
1. The sample size is 244 proposals and the succesd rate is 73.77% (180 of 244).
2. Statistical signicance is denoted by

at the .05 level and

at the .10 level where the critical
values are 1.96 and 1.65 for a two-tailed test. Standard errors are are reported in parentheses.
Cragg-Uhler R-Square = 0.227
3. Change in probability of success in response to a unit change in the corresponding explanatory
variable evaluated at the mean success rate. For dummy variables, the change in probability
measures the eects of a discrete change. See Gunderson, Kervin & Reid (1986).
4. The \Montreal", \Corporations" and \Industry" variables are dummy variables and reported
as ratios.
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TABLE IV
Logit Estimates of the Probability of Acceptance
1
Explanatory variable Mean Logit Change in
coecient
2
probability
3
Expected payo in liquidation
4
0.0717 -0.8688 -0.1629
(0.9700)
Payo in reorganization 0.3441 0.3078 0.0577
(0.5331)
Payments within 1 month / total payments 0.2511 1.1331

0.2124
(0.4593)
Perceived probability of success 0.7040 1.4891

0.2792
(0.8704)
Secured claims / total claims 0.3167 0.3435 0.0644
(0.5971)
Number of amendments 0.4115 2.2372

0.4195
(0.4041)
 unemployment rate (last 6 months) 0.2165 -0.2865

-0.0537
(0.1302)
Time between ling and voting (days) 45.763 -0.0032 0.0006
(0.0022)
Claims of ordinary creditor > 25% 0.4870 0.1814 0.0324
(0.2711)
Holding 0.2344 -1.2123

-0.2784
(0.4125)
Constant -0.5287 |
(0.6631)
Notes:
1. The sample size is 384 proposals and the acceptance rate is 75.0% (288 of 384).
2. Statistical signicance is denoted by

at the .05 level and

at the .10 level where the critical
values are 1.96 and 1.65 for a two-tailed test. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Cragg-Uhler R-Square = 0.272
3. Change in probability of acceptance in response to a unit change in the corresponding ex-
planatory variable evaluated at the mean acceptance rate. For dummy variables, the change
in probability measures the eects of a discrete change.
4. The liquidation and reorganization payo variables are reported on a per dollar of claims
basis.
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TABLE V
Alternative Regressions for Logit Estimates of the Probability of Success
1
Explanatory variable
2
(1)
3
(2) (3)
Prop. of payments within 6 months 1.3692

1.4224

{
(0.4524) (0.4581) {
Number of installments -0.0733

-0.0714

-0.1253

(0.0365) (0.0365) (0.0380)
Proportion of free assets { 0.5446 0.4082
{ (0.4833) (0.4701)
Ratio of Crown claims to total liabilities -4.5953

-4.6102

-4.5281

(2.3059) (2.3337) (2.2885)
Assets to liabilities ratio 0.8449

0.7911 0.5961
(0.4831) (0.4900) (0.4729)
Montreal (dummy) -1.0037

-1.1086

-1.0370

(0.3748) (0.3904) (0.3872)
Corporations (dummy) -0.2051 -0.2040 -0.3094
(0.4643) (0.4688) (0.4693)
Notes:
1. The estimators for the industry dummies and the constant term are not reported.
2. Statistical signicance is denoted by

at the .05 level and

at the .10 level where the critical
values are 1.96 and 1.65 for a two-tailed test. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
3. Estimates of the base model.
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Figure 4
Payment to Creditors in Reorganization
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